

# Gittins Index Tutorial

## Overview

What is the Gittins index?

Solution to the Bayesian/Markovian multi-armed bandit problem

How should one understand the Gittins index?

- $\infty$  super slick proof
- $\Delta V$  dynamic programming
- $\infty$  queueing theory glasses


What <sup>other</sup> problems does the Gittins index solve?

- $\rightarrow$  combinatorial optimization
- $\rightarrow$  "superprocesses"
- $\rightarrow$  arrivals, long-run avg cost


First:  golf!

## Intro

 Markov-process multi-golf



Multi-golf:

- Every turn, hit one ball
- When hit, ball moves to random neighbor
- Goal: minimize time (# hits) to get either ball  $\bullet$  to flag 

$\rightarrow$  minimize  $E[\Phi^\pi]$   
policy  $\pi$

Question: Which ball to hit first?

Use expected # hits to score one ball?

Let  $S_x$  = time from  $\bullet$  at  $x$  to  $\uparrow$  (if not interrupted)  
("swings")

$$E[S_{2,1}] = 1 + \frac{1}{2} E[S_{2,2}] = 3$$

$$E[S_{2,2}] = 1 + E[S_{2,1}] = 4$$

$$E[S_{3,1}] = 5$$


$$E[S_{3,2}] = 8$$

$$E[S_{3,3}] = 9$$


$$E[S_{2,2}] < E[S_{3,1}]$$

... but should hit 3,1 first!

Why 3,1 before 2,2?



Extreme case:  $\infty, 1$  vs  $2, 2$




## Takeaway:

- $E[S_x]$  is relevant if we would hit  $\bullet$  from  $x$  to  $\blacktriangle$  without interruption
- But we might interrupt if another  $\bullet$  is better
- $\Rightarrow E[S_x]$  is not enough!

Generalization: any Markov chain/process, any cost/time per edge

Key idea: Calibrate each state  $x$  to a simple benchmark



Pay-to-win golf

- Every turn, hit ball  $\bullet$  (just one)
- OR give up by paying  $r$
- Goal: minimize total cost to get a  $\blacktriangle$ :

$$\begin{aligned} & \underset{\text{policy } \pi}{\text{minimize}} \left( E[\text{cost from hitting}] + E[\text{cost from giving up}] \right) \\ & = \underset{\text{state sets } Y}{\text{minimize}} \left( \underbrace{E[\text{time to exit } Y]}_{= S_x(Y)} + r \underbrace{P[\text{when out of } Y, \text{ not at } \blacktriangle]}_{= h_x(Y)} \right) \\ & \quad E[S_x(Y)] = s_x(Y) \qquad \text{"had enough"} \end{aligned}$$

Def: Pay-to-win golf cost fn:


$$\begin{aligned} \varphi_x(r, Y) &= s_x(Y) + r h_x(Y) \\ Y^*(r) &= \underset{Y}{\text{argmax}} \varphi_x(r, Y) \\ \varphi_x(r) &= \varphi_x(r, Y^*(r)) \\ &= \underbrace{s_x(Y^*(r))}_{s_x(r)} + r \underbrace{h_x(Y^*(r))}_{h_x(r)} \\ &= s_x(r) + r h_x(r) \end{aligned}$$

For short  $\rightarrow \varphi = s + r h$

How does pay-to-win golf go?

- Play while in  $Y^*(r)$
- Give up if we exit  $Y^*(r)$

What does  $\varphi_x(r)$  look like? How can we use it to "rate" state  $x$ ?



Question: Where on this curve should I look to get a "rating" for  $x$ ?

- Play forever line?
- Give up now line?
- In between?

Def: The Gittins rank of state  $x$  is:

$$\begin{aligned} g_x &= \inf \{ r \geq 0 \mid \varphi_x(r) < r \} \\ &= \inf \{ r \geq 0 \mid x \in Y^*(r) \} \\ &= \inf \{ r \geq 0 \mid \text{play at least once} \} \end{aligned}$$

(The Gittins index is  $\frac{1}{g_x}$ )

Exercise: Find  $g_{2,1}, g_{2,2}, g_{3,1}, g_{3,2}, g_{3,3}, g_{\infty,1}, g_{\infty,2}, g_{\infty,k}, g_{n,k}$

Hint: In each case, what is  $Y^*(g_x)$ ?  $s_x(g_x)$ ?  $h_x(g_x)$ ?

↳ Include  $x \in Y^*(g_x)$

Lemma:  $g_x = \inf_Y \frac{s_x(Y)}{1-h_x(Y)} = \frac{s_x(g_x)}{1-h_x(g_x)}$  } short for  $Y^*(g_x)$

Pf:  $g_x < r \iff \exists Y, s_x(Y) + r h_x(Y) < r \iff \exists Y, \frac{s_x(Y)}{1-h_x(Y)} < r$

↳ Can pick  $Y^*(g_x)$  if  $g_x < r$ , optimal as  $r \rightarrow g_x$

(Going to be less color-coded hereafter...)

# Gittins optimality proof I

∞ Super slick proof

Gittins policy always plays ball at minimal  $g_x$


Optimal for one stochastic ball, one deterministic ball (pay-to-win golf)

Two stochastic balls?

Key idea: Reduce two-ball case to <sup>random</sup> 1 sequence of pay-to-win problems

Def: Consider trajectory  $X_x(t)$  with  $X_x(0) = x$

- The Gittins envelope is  $G_x(t) = \max_{0 \leq u \leq t} g_{X(u)}$
  - The Gittins maximum is  $G_x = G(\infty)$
  - Ball is cool if  $G(t) = g_{X(t)}$ , else hot
- (Often omit  $x$  subscript)



Consider following sequence of times

- $T_0 = 0$ , play through pay-to-win with  $r = g_x = G(T_0)$

We give up iff  $G_x > r$ , and if so...

→ •  $T_1 = S_x(G(T_0))$  is when we give up

⋮

•  $T_{i+1} = S_x(G(T_i)) = T_i + S_{X(T_i)}(g_{X(T_i)})$  while  $G_x > g_{X(T_i)}$

→  $T_i$  is  $i^{\text{th}}$  time ball is cool

Consider  $\varphi_x(g_x) = s_x(g_x) + g_x h_x(g_x) = g_x$

$$\Rightarrow g_x (1 - h_x(g_x)) = s_x(g_x)$$

$$\Rightarrow E[G_x \mathbb{1}(\text{get to } \infty)] = E[\text{time spent playing}]$$

by def. of  $g_x$  (or lemma)

Intuition: imagine instead of pay-to-win, we get a reward when done

More generally:  $E[G_x \mathbb{1}(\text{get to } A) \mid T_i, X(T_i)] = E[\underbrace{G(T_i)}_{=G_i} \mathbb{1}(A_i) \mid T_i, X(T_i)]$

$E[\text{time played in heat } i \mid \dots] = E[\underbrace{T_{i+1} - T_i}_{=S_i} \mid T_i, \underbrace{X(T_i)}_{=X_i}]$

Lem:  $E[G_i \mathbb{1}(A_i) \mid X_i, T_i] = E[S_i \mid X_i, T_i]$

Def: The **pseudotime** of heat  $i$  is  $G_i \mathbb{1}(A_i) = G_x \mathbb{1}(A_i)$

So  $E[\text{pseudotime of heat}] = E[\text{time of heat}]$

But pseudotime is all at the end of heat, if at all, so

$E[\text{pseudotime of incomplete heat}] = 0 \leq E[\text{time of incomplete heat}]$

Lem: For any stopping time  $\tau$ ,  $E[\text{pseudotime by } \tau] \leq E[\text{time by } \tau] = E[\tau]$

Becomes = if always cool at  $\tau$

All of this is still for one ball... but still true for two balls interleaved!

Lem: For any policy  $\pi$ ,  $E[\text{pseudotime of } \pi] \leq E[\text{time of } \pi]$

Becomes = if  $\pi$  only interrupts a ball when it's cool

We have:

$E[\Psi^\pi] \leq E[\Phi^\pi]$

$E[\Psi^{\text{Gittins}}] = E[\Phi^{\text{Gittins}}]$

Same reasoning for any # of jobs

Suffices:

$E[\Psi^{\text{Gittins}}] \leq E[\Psi^\pi]$

Question: Is this true? Why?

- Yes!
- Because  $\Psi^\pi \geq \min\{G_{x_1}, G_{x_2}\} = \Psi^{\text{Gittins}}$

Thm: Gittins policy is optimal, w/  $E[\Phi_{\bar{x}}^{\text{Gittins}}] = E[\min_j G_{x_j}]$

Extension: First  $k$  balls, set of balls is matroid base, ... [Singh '18, GJSS '19]

# Gittins optimality proof 2

## $\Delta V$ Dynamic programming

$$\text{Let } \Phi(\vec{x}) = E[\Phi_{\vec{x}}^{\text{Gittins}}] = E[\min_j G_{x_j}]$$

$\Phi$  is cost-to-go fn of multi-golf

Can we show  $\Phi$  satisfies Bellman eq?

Two steps:

- Write Bellman eq
- Think about  $G_x$  to understand  $\Phi$

Exercise: What is  $P[G_x > r]$ ?

$G_x > r \iff$  give up in pay-to-win from  $x$  w/ cost  $r$

$$\Rightarrow P[G_x > r] = P[\text{give up}] = h_x(r)$$

Exercise: What is  $E[\min\{G_x, r\}]$ ?

$\min\{G_x, r\}$  is pseudotime of pay-to-win golf, playing optimally

$$G_{\text{give-up}} = r$$

So  $E[\text{time}] = E[\text{pseudotime}] = \varphi_x(r)$

$$\Rightarrow E[\min\{G_x, r\}] = \varphi_x(r) = s_x(r) + r h_x(r)$$

Exercise: Write  $E[\min\{G_{x_1}, G_{x_2}\}]$  in two ways: using  $h$  and using  $\varphi$ ,  $G$

$$= \int_0^\infty h_{x_1}(r) h_{x_2}(r) dr = E[\varphi_{x_1}(G_{x_2})] = E[\varphi_{x_2}(G_{x_1})]$$

Hint:  $E[R] = \int_0^\infty P[R > r] dr$   
for non-negative rv  $R$

Generalizing to any # of balls:

$$\Phi(\vec{x}) = \int_0^\infty \prod_j h_{x_j}(r) dr = E \left[ \varphi_{x_i} \left( \min_{j \neq i} G_{x_j} \right) \right]$$

Time to show  $\Phi$  solves Bellman eq

## Def:

$$\circ \Delta_i \underbrace{f(x_i)}_{f(\dots, x_i, \dots)} = E[f(X_{next}) | \text{start at } x_i] - f(x_i)$$

$$\circ \Gamma f(r) = -\frac{1}{r} f(r) = \frac{1}{r} 0 + \frac{r-1}{r} f(r) - f(r)$$



(changing notation:  $\varphi_x(r) \rightsquigarrow \varphi(x, r)$ )

Bellman eq for pay-to-win golf:

$$\underbrace{\min \{ \Delta_i, \Gamma \} \varphi(x_i, r)}_{\text{change in cost-to-go}} = \underbrace{-1}_{\text{cost paid this round}}$$

Specifically:

$$\Delta_i \varphi(x_i, r) \geq -1,$$

$$\text{with } = \text{ iff } x_i \in Y^*(r) \Leftrightarrow g_{x_i} \leq r$$

Bellman eq for multi-golf:

Want to show

$$\min_i \Delta_i \Phi(\vec{x}) = -1$$

$$\Delta_i \Phi(\vec{x}) \geq -1, \\ \text{with } = \text{ iff } g_{x_i} \leq g_{x_j} \quad \forall j \neq i$$

$$\Delta_i \Phi(\vec{x}) = E \left[ \Delta_i \varphi_{x_i} \left( \min_{j \neq i} G_{x_j} \right) \right] \geq -1$$

because  $g_{x_j}$  is min possible value of  $G_{x_j}$

$$\text{with } = \text{ iff } g_{x_i} \leq G_{x_j} \text{ w.p. } 1 \Leftrightarrow g_{x_i} \leq g_{x_j}$$

## Extension:

Sometimes goes through when multiple actions possible per ball  
 ("choice of club")  
 [Whittle '80, Doval '18]

# Gittins optimality proof 3

👁️ Queueing theory glasses

Change of objective: minimize sum of completion times  $\Leftrightarrow$  minimize avg # incomplete jobs

Question: Can we adapt previous proofs to this setting? Yes!

What if jobs arrive over time? Harder...

Recall:  $\frac{\partial}{\partial r} \varphi_x(r) = h_x(r) \Rightarrow \frac{\partial}{\partial r} \frac{\varphi_x(r)}{r} = \frac{-s_x(r)}{r^2}$

$\Rightarrow \int_0^{\infty} \underbrace{\frac{s_x(r)}{r^2}}_{\text{"d/r"}} dr = \frac{\varphi_x(0)}{0} - \frac{\varphi_x(\infty)}{\infty} = 1$

Lemma:  $\int_0^{\infty} E[S_x(r)] d\frac{1}{r} = 1$

Let  $W_{\vec{x}}(r) = \sum_j S_{x_j}(r)$  be "r-work" in system

Lemma  $\Rightarrow \int_0^{\infty} E[W_{\vec{x}}(r)] d\frac{1}{r} = \#\vec{x}$

Let  $W(r)$  be r-work at "uniformly random" time

Thm:  $\int_0^{\infty} E[W(r)] d\frac{1}{r} = E[\#\text{jobs}]$  — WINE: Work Integral Number Equality

Question: How to minimize  $W(r)$ ?

Thm: Gittins minimizes  $E[\#\text{jobs}]$

Extension: Still holds w/ Poisson arrivals  
[SGH '20, SH '21]

